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This paper develops a standard matching model to address the problem of the hidden sector (including non-
registered firms but producing for legal markets), as it is characterised in Italy, i.e. framed in a rather advanced 
economic and institutional setting, but also linked to the socio-economic regional dualism. The main novel 
features of the model are that entrepreneurial ability is heterogeneous, and that regular firms receive negative 
externalities from the hidden sector, and positive externalities from the other regular firms. Not only does an 
interior equilibrium emerge, but two stable equilibria are possible, thus accounting for Italy’s dualism. The 
“bad” equilibrium with respect to the “good” one is in fact characterised by a larger hidden sector, lower levels 
of overall productivity, output, entrepreneurial ability used, extra-profits, skilled employment, wages, and 
investment in education, as well as positive externalities; while the negative externalities, which may capture the 
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 1 – Introduction and summary 
 
“If you hit a mule to make it go, you may succeed, or you may not, since the mule may die”. This 
anonymous maxim can be applied to the resources employed in those economic activities which escape fiscal 
and normative duties although producing for legal markets. These activities, which remain hidden to the public 
authorities, are blamed for the consequent losses in public revenues, and for the deterioration of tax morale. 
Unemployment benefits, heavy taxation, bureaucratic redundancy are seen as the underlying reasons for firms 
and workers “to go underground”. Therefore, a more flexible labour market, lighter taxes, less bureaucratic 
procedures, but also some controls and fines are recommended to make these activities move “overground”. 
Public authorities should thus subject all resources available to the pressure of the market on an equal footing 
(Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
An alternative view argues that valuable entrepreneurial talent can more freely grow in hidden 
activities, thereby training workers and possibly incubating successful enterprises, or even infant industries (De 
Soto, 1989). The economy is thus described as dualistic, and even as producing two different kinds of goods on 
the final market (Agenor and Aizenman, 1999; Bandyopadhyay and Gupta, 1995; Rauch, 1991). A state that 
rigorously imposes taxes and regulations puts the economy at risk of losing resources which may be no longer 
employed for production, so that the expected revenues may not be even retrieved. 
Put briefly, it can be said that the first view considers the quality of the resources available in the 
economy to be given and inter-sectorally homogeneous, and it argues for improving their efficient allocation. 
The second view recognises that the quality of the resources employed in the hidden sector is specifically worse, 
and it addresses the issue of how this quality can be improved. 
The first view often refers to the developed economies, and especially to the phenomenon of 
moonlighting, while the second view usually refers to the less developed economies, and especially to informal 
activities like homework.  
However, the empirical evidence is not clear-cut. Indeed, within the group of the developed countries, 
those with the highest tax burdens and strictest regulations and labour protection legislation, i.e. the European 
Nordic countries, are not those with the largest hidden sector. The US instead exhibits both the lowest intrusion 
of the state into the economy and the lowest proportion of the hidden sector (Bovi and Dell’Anno, 2007). On the 
whole, several cross-country studies find a negative correlation between the tax marginal rate and the size of the 
hidden economy (e.g. Johnson et al., 1998, 1999; Friedman et al., 2000). Notwithstanding, there is widespread 
consensus that overall taxation and social security contributions are crucial in explaining the rise of the shadow 
economy. However, many authors support the view that also moral corruption and bribery lead potential 
employers into the irregular economy (Loayaza, 1996; Fortin et al., 1997; Agenor and Aizenman, 1999; Johnson 
et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; Fugazza and Jacques, 2004), while the provision of public services financed by 
relatively high taxation and income has been found to be significantly and positively correlated (Johnson et al., 
1998). Finally, no agreement in the literature emerges about the effects of the shadow economy on GDP (Eilat 
and Zinnes, 2000). 
This paper is theoretical, but it addresses the problem of the hidden sector as it is characterised in Italy, 
i.e. framed in a rather advanced economic and institutional setting, but also localised and linked to the economy 
  4of specific regions (see Appendix A). In fact, the paper pays particular attention not only to the typical features of 
the irregular firm but also to the very different contexts in which firms operate. 
Almost by definition, reliable data on the irregular firm, on the hidden sector, and on the links between 
the two sectors are not available. Most data regard estimations on the proportion of the hidden sector in the 
entire economy, with serious problems of disentangling the illegal sector (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Zizza, 
2002). Some other data on Italy provide information only on irregular workers, and on tax evasion. However, 
pilot studies, case studies, and occasional observations are able to characterise the typical irregular firm and its 
links with the other firms (Donolo and Capparucci, 2002; Meldolesi and Aniello, 1998; Meldolesi, 1998). 
The typical entrepreneur running an irregular firm adopts old techniques in a small-sized organisation, 
employs unskilled labour, pays low wages, and produces intermediate goods for bigger official firms, competing 
on a price basis. His entrepreneurial ability is typically based on family connections, with no cooperation with 
the other firms, largely eschewing information on legislation even when it may be advantageous. Networking 
with the other firms is local; orders are signed after a fierce price competition which is likely to be unfair. When 
irregular workers are employed through some sort of selection on the market, the relationships are usually based 
on distrust, which provokes frequent micro-conflicts. In some Southern Italian regions, irregular firms are often 
embedded in a social system where criminal organisations operate (Fazio, 2004). Economic transactions comply 
with the usual market laws even less. Public authorities are corrupted, and the entire economy is affected. 
Official firms must pay bribes and protection money. Therefore, entrepreneurs must deal with a context in which 
market distortions impose specific costs. 
Some recent empirical studies have shown the adverse effects of organized crime on economic growth 
and on the local institutional system (e.g., Centorrino and Ofria, 2008; Peri, 2004). A survey conducted by 
Marini and Turato (2002) on a panel of entrepreneurs from the North-East of Italy reported that almost the entire 
sample of interviewees (92.6%) regarded criminality to be the main obstacle against the development of 
enterprises in the Mezzogiorno area. A survey conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Economy in 11 countries 
confirms that entrepreneurs perceive the Mezzogiorno as an area which lacks security (Gpf-Ispo, 2005) (see 
again Appendix A). 
The paper addresses this complex issue on fairly usual assumptions, and on new key assumptions. The 
former are the following: irregular firms adopt techniques which are relatively less efficient than those of official 
firms in order to produce the same product, they evade taxes despite the risk of being detected and punished, 
they do not pay start-up costs. The new key assumptions are the following: firstly, regular firms enjoy positive 
externalities from the other regular firms, but they also suffer from negative externalities produced by the 
irregular firms. Secondly, entrepreneurial ability is heterogeneous across individuals, while also workforce skills 
is assumed as heterogeneous. 
In particular, the paper adopts a matching model which shares several features that can be found in the 
literature on matching models and hidden economy (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Bouev, 2002, 2005; Kolm 
and Larsen, 2003), but it departs because of the assumption of the heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability. Since 
this is not a tradeable input for firms, entry into the market is not completely free, so that the standard zero-profit 
conditions hold only for the marginal entrepreneurs, i.e. those endowed with the minimum ability. The other, 
abler, entrepreneurs earn extra-profits. This new assumption provides a new solution to the problem of 
determining the allocation of vacant jobs between the regular and the irregular sector. 
  5The paper is thus able to give a theoretical account of a number of facts: at the macroeconomic level, 
the persistence of a substantial proportion of the hidden sector with detrimental effects on overall output and 
underemployment, and on investment in education; at the microeconomic level, some key characteristics of 
irregular firms, such as their relatively lower entrepreneurial ability used, lower-skilled workers employed, 
lower wages earned. 
When the analysis concentrates on the role of externalities, the paper shows other results by recognising 
the particular non-linearity of externalities in diffusing themselves. Two final aggregate outcomes may emerge 
within the same institutional structure and with the same economic potential. The “bad” outcome consists of a 
relatively large hidden sector, important negative externalities, and reduced positive externalities; the “good” 
outcome consists of a relatively small hidden sector, important positive externalities, and reduced negative 
externalities. 
This approach to the problem of the hidden economy makes it possible to extend the opportunity of 
policy actions from the fine tuning of the institutional duties (Kolm and Larsen, 2003), from larger individual 
benefits of participating in the regular sector (Fugazza and Jacques, 2004; Valentini, 2007), and from labour-
market liberalisation (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Bouev, 2002, 2005), to actions aiming at increasing 
positive externalities and reducing negative ones. 
The paper is organised as follows: sections 2 and 3 present the simple benchmark model and, 
respectively, the extended model, where externalities are endogenised; section 4 performs some numerical 
simulations, while section 5 concludes with some policy implications. The appendices B-F set out the relevant 
proofs and math details. 
 
2 – The benchmark model 
 
The model proposes a general equilibrium model of the matching type (Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1994; Pissarides, 2000).
1 This means that both firm’s equilibrium and aggregate equilibrium are studied, and 
that there are frictions in the labour market because firms and workers do not perfectly match. The general 
equilibrium character is particularly stressed, because the model comprises two types of firms, thus forming two 
sectors, and because each firm is affected by the sectoral composition. The matching character of the model 
enables study of joint decision-making by entrepreneurs and workers, thus yielding non-market clearing wages 
in the two sectors, and unemployment. 
The environment is characterised by a non-competitive labour market with wage bargaining.
2 
Numerous firms competitively produce a homogeneous product,
3 but adopt different institutional and 
technological set-ups. They may be registered, and therefore pay a production tax and adopt a relatively 
advanced technology; or they may not be registered, and therefore evade taxes and adopt a less efficient 
                                                           
1 Hence, as usually assumed, time is continuous, and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely, and 
discount the future at an exogenous discount rate r. 
2 In this work we abstract from goods and capital markets (both of which are assumed to clear) in order to 
highlight the joint effect of search frictions and rent sharing on job composition, rather than on prices of both 
capital input and final output. 
3 Bouev (2002) also assumes that goods produced in both regular and irregular sectors are perfect substitutes. 
Indeed, if different goods are being produced, one could ask how come the workers and consumers are able to 
locate the irregular firms whereas the tax authorities are not fully able to. 
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process employed, not because of the good being produced.
4 Each firm is run by an entrepreneur who is an 
individual endowed with an extra-ability to run a new firm. 
An unexpected result of the model is that equilibrium is not necessarily a corner solution, as a 
competitive market for a homogeneous product might suggest. The key assumption for obtaining at least one 
interior solution is that entrepreneurs are endowed with different abilities. This is a new assumption in the family 




2.1  Entrepreneurs’ expected profitability and workers’ expected wages 
As is usual in matching-type models (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), let us assume 
that the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed workers is regulated by a matching function with constant 
returns to scale. Let us denote the number of vacancies in the official (or regular) sector and in the hidden (or 
irregular) sector with vr and vs respectively, and the number of unemployed with u. The unemployed workers 
are the only job seekers in the labour market.
6 The matching function of filled jobs (m) in the two sectors (r,s) is 
thus as follows:
7
mi = m (vi, u )      with i = r,s 
which is positive and concave in the two arguments. Since the function performs constant returns to scale, it 
implies that: 
f (θi)  = mi (vi, u ) / vi         g (θi)  = θi· f(θi)  = mi (vi, u ) / u  with i = r,s          
where θi = vi / u represents the tightness of the labour market in each sector from the firm’s standpoint; f(θi) 
indicates the instantaneous probability of a firm filling a vacancy in the official and the hidden sector 
respectively. Conversely, g(θi) indicates the instantaneous probability of an unemployed person finding a job in 
the official and the hidden sector respectively. The properties of the functions indicate that the greater the 
vacancy rate or the smaller the unemployment rate, the smaller the probability of filling a vacancy for firms, and 
the greater the probability of finding a job for the unemployed, i.e.: 
f’(θi) < 0  and  g’(θi) > 0  with i = r,s. 
The modelling of the match between firms and workers depends on the form of matching technology 
used. Nevertheless, a Cobb-Douglas functional form is generally favoured by empirical studies.
8 In this case: 
f”(θi) > 0  and  g”(θi) < 0  with i = r,s. 
                                                           
4 This is also the definition usually used for the hidden, shadow, or underground economy (OECD, 
2002). 
5 The literature that employs matching models instead concentrates on the study of the individual’s choice 
between running a firm or working as an employee (Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides, 2001; Pissarides, 
2001 and 2003; Uren, 2007). 
6 In terms of flows, the model ignores on-the-job-search and direct transitions from shadow to legal 
employment without intervening unemployment spells. 
7 Unlike Bouev (2002, 2005), Kolm and Larsen (2003), Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Albrecht et al. 
(2006), we assume a directed search. In the presence of an undirected search both formal and informal vacancies 
have the same probability of meeting workers; then it is the total number of vacancies that enters the matching 
function. 
8 For a review see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), while Stevens (2004) provides microeconomic foundations 
for it. 
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() 0 lim = →∞ θ θ f ,      () ∞ = → θ θ f 0 lim ,      ( ) ∞ = →∞ θ θ g lim ,      ( ) 0 lim 0 = → θ θ g . 
Therefore, when  () i f θ  and  () i g θ ∞ < , matching is not instantaneous and takes some time (Bouev, 2005). 
The usual Bellman equations for the expected values of a vacancy, and for a filled job over the infinite 
horizon, specified for each sector, are as follows:9
Value of …  Hidden sector  Official sector 
a vacancy  () [ ] s s s s V J f V r − ⋅ = ⋅ θ   () [] r r r r V J f c V r − ⋅ + − = ⋅ θ  
a filled job  () [ ] s s s s s s J V w y x J r − + − − = + δ ρφτ ρ   [] r r r r r r J V s w k y px rJ − + − − − + = δ τ ) (
searching a job  () [ ] s s s s U W g U r − ⋅ = ⋅ θ   ( ) [] r r r r U W g U r − ⋅ = ⋅ θ  
being employed  () [ ] s s s s W U w W r − ⋅ + + = ⋅ ρ δ   [] r r r r W U w W r − ⋅ + = ⋅ δ  
 
where Vi is the value of a vacancy, Ji is the value of a filled job, c is the start-up cost in the regular sector, p>1 
is the exogenous productivity premium in the official sector, xi is the entrepreneurial ability level (discussed in 
2.2), yi is the labour productivity (discussed in 2.3), wi is the wage rate, τ is an exogenous production tax, ρ is 
the exogenous instantaneous probability of a firm being discovered as unregistered (or monitoring rate), φ is the 
exogenous multiplier of the tax due to be levied, δ is an exogenous bankruptcy rate of firm,
10 Ui is the value for 
seeking a job (the unemployed workers can’t search for a job in both sectors at the same time),
11 Wi is the value 
for being employed. 
The symbols k and s denote the specific advantages and disadvantages for regular firms, like the 
benefits of participating in a larger information network and of receiving specific public services, and 
conversely, of paying bureaucratic and administrative costs, including bribes and money protection if imposed 
by criminal organisations. Both s and k are temporarily assumed as parameters in this section, but they will be 
considered as variables in the next section on the extended model.  
The vacancy equations state that the return to the vacancy is equal to the potential change in value in 
the case of a successful match minus the cost of posting the vacancy, i.e. the start-up cost, which is zero in the 
hidden sector. The filled job equations state that the return to the firm is equal to the difference between the 
job’s productivity and costs, plus the potential change in value in the case of a breakdown in the match 
(bankruptcy of firm). A job’s productivity depends on entrepreneurial ability and the worker’s skill; and in the 
case of a regular firm, it also depends on a productivity premium, thereby capturing a technological advantage, 
and on receiving positive externalities. A job’s costs are wage costs, taxes or fines (where reasonably ρφ <1), 
and in the case of a regular firm, the negative externalities deriving from the other firms. If the irregular firm is 
discovered, then the job is destroyed, and it does not turn into an unfilled vacancy. The equations for the 
unemployed state that the return on being unemployed equals the potential change into employment in the case 
of a match. The equations for the employed workers state that the return on employment is equal to the wage 
                                                           
9 Note that Bellman functions are specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions. 
10 We ignore the possibility of voluntary quits by workers. 
11 No unemployment benefit is considered because it is not quantitatively important in Italy. 
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firm). 
The Bellman equations thus yield: 
( ) ( )
() () r
r r r r
r f r r
f r c s w k y x p
V
θ δ
θ δ τ θ
/ ) ( 1
/ ) ( ) (
+ +
+ − − − − + ⋅ ⋅
=




() ( ) s
s s s
s f r r r
w y x
V
θ δ ρ ρ
ρφτ θ
+ + + +
− −
=
                                                                                                [2]
 
as well as the value of a filled job in the two sectors, thus defining the different profitability of running a regular 
firm (Jr) with respect to an unregistered firm (Js): 
() ( )
δ
θ δ τ θ
+
⋅ + − − − + ⋅ ⋅
=
r
V s w k y x p
J
r r r r r
r
) (





θ δ τ φ ρ θ
+ +
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅
=
r
V w y x
J
s s s s s
s
                                                                                   
[4] 
Successful matches in each sector enjoy a pure economic rent, and wages are assumed to be the 
outcome of a Nash bargaining problem, with workers earning a share of the total surplus of a filled job, i.e. the 




r r r r r U W V J w − ⋅ − =
− 1 max arg )
)
 
where  ( 1   0, ∈ β  is the surplus share for labour. Analogously, the wage rate in the irregular firm is obtained 
with a share γ, which is assumed to be smaller than β because workers’ bargaining power in the hidden sector is 
lower than in the official sector, owing to the absence of protective legislation and unions. 
  Simple manipulations thus yield the formulae for wages (see Appendix B for details): 
() [] () [] () [] 1 1 + + + + + −




r g r f r
s c k y x p
w
θ δ θ δ β β
τ
                                                            
        [5] 
() [] () [] () [] 1 1 + + + + + + + −




s g r f r
y x
w
θ ρ δ θ ρ δ γ γ
τ φ ρ
                                                        [6] 
Wages in the official sector are advantaged over wages in the hidden sector for the following reasons: 
γ < β ; p > 1; and vr > vs and hence θr > θs. The latter condition is usual (e.g. see Boeri and Garibaldi’s (2006) 
calibrations), but it is not always accepted in the literature. One reason is that the official sector is larger, or even 
much larger, than the hidden sector, so that the unemployed have fewer chances of meeting irregular vacancies. 
 
2.2  Entrepreneurial ability and the career choice 
An entrepreneur runs a one-job firm after having posted a vacancy. A key feature of the model is that 
the comparison of expected profitability of running firms in the two sectors depends on the entrepreneurial 
ability of individuals (x). Each individual is in fact assumed to be endowed with a specific entrepreneurial ability 
which cannot be used on the job as a worker, and which may have a level different from that of the other 
individuals. 
  9Formally, entrepreneurial ability x is distributed over a continuum of infinitely-living individuals who 
expect to enter the market, with population size normalised to one. It can be measured in continuous manner, 
]0, ], following the known cumulative distribution function F(x), so that:  max x





Let us assume that individuals with an entrepreneurial ability equal to 1 (and below) do not find it 
convenient to post vacancies in the hidden sector because Vs = 0. Hence, ys − τφρ = ws, and also running an 
irregular firm is not profitable, since Js = 0 from [4]. All the entrepreneurs thus find it convenient to post 
vacancies and run irregular firms because they earn a rent from their extra-ability, i.e. with  . Also the 
positive sign of ws > 0 is thus determined from [6]. 
1 > x
An analogous, though not so immediate, reasoning can be applied to regular vacancies and firms. In 
fact, Vr = 0 requires that p yr + k − τ − s = wr + c·(δ + r) / f (θr), but this depends on θr. Plugging [5] in this 













































The limit of the left-hand-side for vr tending to 0 gives pyr + k − τ − s = 0. Therefore, higher than minimum 
ability, i.e. with  , enables entrepreneurs to have the condition Vr > 0 and to cover their start-up costs. 
Similar conditions govern Jr > 0. Positive wages in the official sector are also warranted. 
1 > x
 Accordingly,  individuals  endowed with an entrepreneurial ability equal to 1 or below become workers 
(l) and then do not post any vacancy. Formally: 
() ( ) ∫ = ≡
1
0
  1 x dF x F l  
Therefore, we get: 
s r n n l u − − =                                                                                                                             [7] 
where nr and ns are the steady-state employment in the official and hidden sectors respectively (nr and ns will be 
determined in subsection 2.4). 
Further, let us assume that a threshold level of entrepreneurial ability T∈[ , ] exists such that 
two firms drawn from the two sectors yield equal expected profitability. More precisely, let us assume that: 
1 > x max x
() ( s s s r r r y T J y T J , , , , ) θ θ =                                                                                                          
Therefore, T can be derived from [1]-[6]:
12
                                                           
12 This formalisation is similar to the one adopted by Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001) and 
Pissarides (2001), who, however, study the individuals’ choice between entering the market as an entrepreneur 
or becoming a worker. 
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Each entrepreneur assumes u  as given. Let us here determine vi. The entrepreneur’s indifference 
condition between running firms in the two sectors implies that the share of entrepreneurs in the hidden sector is 














                                                                                                                      
[9] 
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F T F v
 
1         
1 ) (
                                                                                                                    
[10] 
Entrepreneurs, i.e. those individuals endowed with entrepreneurial ability  , may post a vacancy 
and fill the job, or fail to fill it, in one of the two sectors, so that it can be simply stated that 
1 > x
() l v v s r + − =1 .
14 
Hence, equation [8] can be re-written in a more general form as follows: 
( s r s y y v T T , , = )   
                   
[11] 
 great, as guaranteed by the
nd al se ∂
                     w i t h                     T’(yr) < 0, T’(ys)  >  0  
Equations [10] and [11] can thus be studied in the diagram with axes [vs, T ] like Fig.3. Equation [11] is 
monotonically decreasing in θs, and hence in vs (depicted as a continuous line in Fig.3), because productivities 
in the two sectors are assumed to be sufficiently  conditions for  0 > r V ,  0 > s V  
discussed above, a so becau vr /∂vs< 0,  ( ) 0 ' < r r V θ ,  ( ) 0 ' < s s V θ . Equation [10] is monotonically 
rising in T, from  1 = x  up to  max x depends on the distribution of ability across entrepreneurs.   and its fo
                                                          
rm 
 
13 Note that this is a approach different from the usual one, which uses V(θ i )=0 as the condition to determine θ i 
together with the wage equation. In this model, in fact, entrepreneurs have heterogeneous ability. 
14 This pattern may imply a negative relationship between the shadow economy and economic growth. 
Although there is no agreement in the literature on the sign of this relationship, there is some empirical evidence 
to support the hypothesis of a negative relation between the Italian shadow economy and the official growth rate 
of GDP (Dell’Anno and Schneider, 2003). 
  11Equation [11] has  higher than the 
intercep
=== ere (now at the end) ========== 
of the worst quality (see also Pugno, 
2000a; C
ages in the official sector have a further advantage besides those mentioned above with 
respect to wages in the hidden sector. In fact, regular firms are more productive because they are run by more 
able entr neur
ent 
. Busetta and Giovannini, 
1998; B e
r unskilled or skilled, thus achieving two different levels of labour productivity if they 
choose to invest in education properly (Acemoglu, 1996): indeed, formal education enhances the worker’s skill 
nvestment in education. This choice is linked to the job for which workers expect to be 
employe
ment in education is beneficial to workers in two respects: it raises 
their ini
e as
disutility from sc lastic effort. Let  denote the utility cost to workers from investment in education. The 
                                                          
 been built for T∈[ 1 > x , max x ], so that the vertical start-point of [11] is
t of [10]. 
=======  Fig. 3 about h
Remarks. (i) A unique couple of ( vs , T ) exists; (ii) the solution of the system [10]-[11] in the dynamic 
form yields a stable solution. 
This is the key result of the benchmark model, which will be proved in Appendix C and completed in 
the next subsections. However, an interesting conclusion can be drawn here: that entrepreneurs will prefer the 
hidden sector if they are endowed with x < T, and they will prefer the official sector if endowed with x > T. 
Some entrepreneurial ability may thus remain hidden, but it will also be 
arillo and Pugno, 2004; Rauch, 1991, Levenson and Maloney, 1998). This conclusion runs counter to 
the argument that the shadow sector is an incubator of infant industries. 
Secondly, w
epre s.  
 
2.3  The workers’ skill and the endogenous schooling investm
Although the workers have inadequate entrepreneurial ability, they are endowed with a positive level of 
productivity which can be used on the job. Empirical findings show that  s r y y > (e.g  
oeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006), so that we would expect, on th  firms’ side, to find that official firms 
employ high-skill workers, while low-skill workers are sufficient for irregular firms.
15
Given that the labour force supplies labour time inelastically,
16 let us assume that workers enter the 
labour market eithe
(Laing et al. 1995): 
() unskilled skilled r y e y y ⋅ + = ≡ 1  
where e denotes i
d because they may work with two different technologies, as captured by the premium p > 1 for the 
official sector. 
We now consider the optimal choice of investment in education (e*) by workers in the economic 
environment described beforehand. Invest
tial stock of human capital and their ability to accumulate additional human capital once employed 
(Laing et. al., 1995). 
W sume that schooling investment is costly, as a result of either a direct pecuniary cost or the 
ho () e c
 
 
16 In a matching framework this hypothesis has also been used by Bouev (2002, 2005). 
15 Firms’ productivity is supposed to be known by the entrepreneurs, including workers’ skill. 
  12function  is  continuously differentiable, and convex in e, and satisfies 
/ 0   ∂ c
Each individual is conceived of as solving the following programme (see e.g. Laing et. al., 1995; 




≥0   
ising e implies: 
() e c
  strictly increasing, twice 
() 0   = ∂e . 
 
() {} r max with i = r,s 
Accordingly, in the official sector, optim







being  W  from the match in each of the two sectors can be derived from 
the Bellman equations. Knowing that
[]r r r S U ⋅ = − β . Surpluses Si arising
  ( ) i i i i i U W V J S − + − = , straightforward algebra gives: 
() ()
( ) () () r r g f r θ β θ β δ ⋅ + ⋅ − + + 1




c s k e y x p
e S


















⋅ ⋅ ∂ β θ
 
This is the optimalization standard condition: the individual’s marginal revenue consequent on 
investme  that workers expecting to be employed in the 
official sector find it optimal to invest in educat  a macroeconomic point of view, it also follows that 
investment in education is proportional to the official sector, because the higher 
nt in education must be equal to its marginal cost. It states
ion. From
r θ  is, the greater is the 
marginal  in education. 
The same procedure applies to the hidden sector, so that: 
 revenue of investment





θ γ θ γ ρ
τ φ ρ
⋅ + ⋅ − + +




s r δ +
 
entually, we get:  
∂ = 0
from the properties of cost function, i.e. 
() * *  e / e ∂    c
( ) 0   / 0   = ∂ ∂ e c , first-order condition for the hidden sector implies 
that  = * e 0 , i.e. workers expecting to be employed in the hidden sector find it optimal to do not invest in 
These results are confirmed by empirical findings in Italy (Cappa
 
education. 
riello and Zizza, 2009). 
ed by determining the stock of workers into the official and hidden sectors. 
We have argued that 
2.4  Closing the model in the labour market 
Finally, the model is clos
jobs arrive to unemployed workers at rate  ( ) i g θ  and regular and irregular filled jobs 
break up at rate δ  and () δ ρ + , respectively. 
  13Therefore, the eq he evoluti uations for t on of employment in the two sectors in terms of the worker's 
transition rates are the following: 
() r r r n g u n ⋅ − ⋅ = δ θ &                                                                                                                      
()() s s s n g u n ⋅ + − ⋅ = ρ δ θ &
                                                                                 





















                       [13]  
Employment in the model has two components: entrepreneurs and workers. Entrepreneurs are never 
unemployed, they always manage either vacant or filled jobs. Therefore total empl
by
oyment in the model is given 
  () [] s r n n F + + − 1 1 . 
Steady-state unemployment is thus given by [7], [12] and [13]: 
() ()
( )
() ( ) () ( ) δ θ ρ δ θ
ρ δ δ
θ θ + + ⋅ ρ δ δ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅
ρ δ δ
= ⇒ = u u         [14] 
+ +






The temporary assumption that u is given to the entrepreneurs can be dropped. In order to show clearly 
that equation [14] closes the model, it can be re-written in the general form  ( ) u u Γ = , by also considering that 
changes of u shift the function [8] in fig. 1 and then changes of 
Proposition. An aggregate equilibrium with positive u  in th d it is uni
Proof. In order to proof the uniqueness of the equilibrium it suffices to study the slope of the l.h.s and 
s v . 
e model exists an que. 
the r.h.s of equation [14]. The l.h.s side of [14] is an increasing linear function of u, whereas the r.h.s. of [14] is 
a rising and concave function in u for given vr and vs, because  ( ) 0 / < ∂ ∂ u g i θ  and  > ∂ ∂ u g i θ . Note 
that being a rate, u ranges between 0 and 1, i.e. 
() 0 /
2 2
( ). Since  ( ) 0 1 0 < <u 0 lim = Γ → u () u  and  1 lim 1 < Γ → u u , a 
unique i anges of vr(u) and vs(u), through changes 
in T, can nt ; e o  a
ntersection exists between the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. Induced ch
not cumulate themselves because they are compleme ary  th ref re, we lso get  () 1 ' < Γ u .## 
With knowledge of  s v , T ,  r v , and u , the number of regular and irregular entrepreneurs, workers, 
total employment and the overall unemployment rate, given in (14), are all uniquely determined. 
Therefore, the equilibrium of the model can be defined thus: 
Definition. The solutions for the five key variables   and   are obtained by considering: 
1) the Bellman equations; 2)
s v , v, T , e u
 the Nash bargaining rule; 3) the entrepreneur’s indifference condition between 
running firms in the two sectors, given their ability distribution; 4) the optimalization of skill accumulation; 5) 
the equilibrium condition of the transition flows in the labour market. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
  14The main result is that an interior solution exists where both the hidden sector and the official sector 
survive in equilibrium (see also Pugno, 2000a, and Carillo and Pugno, 2004). As claimed by Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2006), this may explain the “shadow puzzle”, i.e. the persistence of the hidden sector despite advances in 
detection technologies and organisation by public authorities to reduce irregularities. 
A number of other important results can be drawn from exercises of comparative statics. A general 
exercise concerns the effects of the shift of the T-curve [11] due to changes in some parameters. Its downward 
shift dec
ctor, as clearl merges from [9]
[10] and as implied by
The downward shi
:
reases the equilibrium vs in Fig. 3, but it also decreases the equilibrium vs in the entire model, since the 
feedback through u is of minor importance. Therefore, the downward shift of the T-curve [11] squeezes the 
proportion of the hidden sector and expands the proportion of the official se y e  and 
 [7], [12] and [13] together. 
ft of the T-curve [11], and the squeeze of the hidden sector increases unemployment 
if vr is sufficiently large (see the Appendix D); otherwise it reduces unemployment. Showing this requires use of 
the  Beveridge Curve, i.e. equation [14]  from this we obtain  0 / < ∂ ∂ r v u ,  0 / < ∂ ∂ s v u   and 
s r v u v u ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ / /  (see Appendix E). As a result, if vr is sufficiently large, the Beveridge Curve of the hidden 
sector is steeper than the Beveridge Curve of the official sector, which means that when the hidden sector 
decrease
of the T-curve [11] may very likely increase overall output, because the official 
sector ac
effects. 
nother result claimed by Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) can also be drawn from our model: the shadow 
er, the better the aggregate economic conditions. In fact, for a greater yr, the 
T-curve i  shifted downwards, so that wr is greater both directly and indirectly through the rise in vr. Therefore, 
gap wr −
s are diffused and pervasive in the economy with respect to the irregular firms, they operate more 
efficiently than in the case where they are relatively few. In fact, information flow more easily, trust is more 
s the unemployment rate increases.
17 The effect is not large, because the effects of the two sectors 
partially offset each other. More generally, therefore, the result is that a change in the hidden sector can have an 
ambiguous but small effect on unemployment. This ambiguity reflects the lack of consensus in the literature, 
both theoretical and empirical, on this issue (see Tanzi, 1999; Giles and Tedds, 2002). 
The downward shift 
hieves greater productivity than the hidden sector for three reasons: first, the official sector exhibits the 
premium p, which captures its greater technological level; second, it employs skilled workers; third, the most 
able entrepreneurs prefer this sector. The possible reduction of the hidden sector must be very substantial to 
compensate for these 
A
wage gap, i.e. the wage gap, is wid
s
 ws widens. 
 
  3 – The extended model 
 
The performances of the regular firm and the irregular firm differ not only because of their 
technological level and other specific economic features but also because of the contexts in which they operate. 
If regular firm
widespread, networking is more diffused, and a more efficient use of public services, including information and 
                                                           
17 This
w employment will result in higher open unemployment. 
 conclusion run counter to Bouev’s (2002, 2005) idea that scaling down the unofficial sector can lead to a 
decrease in the level of unemployment, whereas it agree with the idea of Boeri and Garibaldi (2002, 2006) that 
attempts to reduce, in the first place, shado
  15assistanc
se in those regions the hidden sector is linked to the illegal sector and to criminal 
organisat
on-linear diffusion also 
emerges 
enables, 1996). 
Our model is able to capture these phenom s and k 
xed parameters and t r s
e from the public authorities and agencies, becomes possible. Large positive externalities are at work in 
this case.
18  
By contrast, if the hidden sector is widespread, large negative externalities on the regular firms may be 
at work. The unfortunate case of the Southern regions of Italy provides the clearest example of these 
externalities, becau
ions. Transaction costs become greater in this case, market networking becomes distorted, and tax 
morality worsens.
19
Both positive and negative externalities can be characterised by a non-linearity which is typical of 
diffusion of the contagion-type. In the case of positive externalities, the diffusion of information and of trustful 
entrepreneurial behaviour typically follows the bandwagon effect, which characterises the acceleration of the 
central phase of the diffusion process (Minniti, 2005). A similar pattern seems to follow criminal behaviour 
(Glaeser et al., 1996) and criminal enterprises (Pugno, 2000b), which exert negative externalities onto regular 
firms. The underlying mechanism of the S-shape pattern of diffusion is Schelling’s (1978: ch.3) argument of 
critical mass in imitative behaviour on spatial basis (see also Granovetter 1978). The n
if imitation simply follows costs reduction because of strategic complementarities on spatial basis, thus 
explaining the geographical concentration (Krugman, 1991; Puga and V
ena with interesting results. Let us cease considering 
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Ω − Ω +
Ω
                                                                                                                       [16]
 
The key property of [15], which is monotonically increasing with respect to vs, is the convexity in the first trait 
and then the concavity. The function [16] has the same properties with respect to vr, but opposite properties with 




ve the horizontal position of the inflection point, if numbered with 2, and the slope of the function, if 
numbered with 3. The adoption of these specifications fixes the ideas without losing in generality. 
The parameter Φ1 captures the administrative and bureaucratic burdens and the maximum burden 
imposed by the criminal context, while Φ3 gives the acceleration effect when the critical density of the
has been approached. Similarly, Ω1 captures the maximum possible effect of the positive externalities 
arising from the diffusion of regular firms, while Ω3 gives the acceleration effect of these externalities. 
                                                           
18 There is a large body of evidence for the spillover effects on productivity. See Cooper and Haltiwanger 
(1996) for a survey on this literature. For the importance of social networks for entrepreneurship see Aldrich and 
Zimmer (1986), and Granovetter (1985). 
19 Cross-section analysis of developed and developing countries shows that the size of the hidden sector is 
significantly negatively correlated with generalised trust (D’Hernoncourt and Méon, 2008), and that generalised 
trust is negatively correlated with corruption. Although the connection between trust and corruption is 
reciprocal, the effect of trust on corruption is greater than the reverse (Uslaner, 2002). Further, hidden activity is 
larger in countries where managers are more likely to pay bribes, where managers pay for mafia-type protection, 
where managers have less faith in the legal system (Johnson et al., 2000), and where corruption is generally 
more widespread (Buehn and Schneider, 2009). 
  16If the functions s(vs) and k(1–vs) as in [15] and [16] are plugged into [8], then the relationship between 
T and vs can change significantly, since a “hump” arises. For vs close to zero, negative externalities tend to the 
minimum, and positive externalities tend to the maximum. For rising vs, the threshold value of entrepreneurial 
ability, i
with respect to the positive externalities. This captures 
two dist
lly unstable, since it can act as a saddlepoint (see Appendix F). The two 
relevant equilibria ditions where the 
proporti
mployment in the “good” equilibrium should be substitutable with 
employm
 w
ns that differ in their histories alone, as captured by different initial levels of  . The region 
starting 
                                                          
.e. T, is declining when vs remains low, but it rises when the density of the irregular firms accelerates 
the negative externalities and largely reduces the positive externalities, since greater entrepreneurial ability is 
required. After this acceleration of the externalities, the usual forces that reduce function [8] once again prevail, 
thus going towards the conditions where negative externalities are at the maximum, and positive externalities are 
at the minimum, since vs becomes predominant. 
If the accelerations and decelerations were irrelevant and externalities diffused themselves smoothly, 
then the slope of the extended variant of [8] would be less steep or steeper than the slope of the benchmark 
function, depending on the importance of the negative 
inct facts: that control over the territory by criminal organisations discourages the establishment of 
regular firms, thus reducing the proportion of the official sector, and that efficient networking requires numerous 
official partner firms. Crossing the extended variant of [8] with [10] determines the unique equilibrium in a 
similar way as in the benchmark case. The only difference is that the proportion of the hidden sector is greater if 
negative externalities are greater than the positive ones. 
However, if accelerations and decelerations are significant and externalities diffuse themselves roughly, 
then three intersections between the extended variant of [8] and [10] become possible, as depicted in Fig.3 
(dotted line).
20 The extreme intersections are the relevant ones, because they define two stable equilibria. The 
intersection in the middle is genera
 may be labelled as “good” and “bad” because they define two different con
on of the hidden sector is small and, respectively, large; production is high and, respectively, low; the 
entrepreneurial ability is used efficiently and, respectively, inefficiently; skilled workers are many, and, 
respectively, few; negative externalities are limited, and, respectively, widespread; positive externalities are 
exploited, and, respectively, scarce. 
========== Fig. 3 about here (now at the end) ========== 
According to the model, une
ent in the hidden sector because the official sector would be large. But in the “bad” equilibrium, the 
official sector may be not sufficiently large, so that unemployment may be complementary to employment in the 
hidden sector. A more reliable result on unemployment, however, rests on the fact that several orkers in the 
irregular firms appear as unemployed in the official statistics, so that they will be more numerous in the “bad” 
with respect to the “good” equilibrium. 
This result is interesting because it can represent an economy characterised by a uniform structure, 
including the institutional structure, as captured by the same parameters of the model, but with two regions and 
two populatio s v
with a greater proportion of the hidden sector may converge towards the “bad” equilibrium, while the 
region starting with a smaller proportion of the hidden sector may converge towards the “good” equilibrium. 
 
20 Also Minniti’s (2005) model of entrepreneurship and non-linear externalities, but without the hidden 
sector, exhibits multiple equilibria. 
  17Distortions, both costly and beneficial, develop differently, and eventually establish a dualism in both economic 
and social aspects. The Italian North-South divide, which is special but not unique in the world, can thus find an 
explanation. 
Therefore, these results strengthen the idea of the persistence of shadow activities, since they emerge as 
enomena insofar as the hidden sector is really small in the “good” equilibrium. Economic 
developm th sectors, and it thus may not change greatly in the relative 
proportion of the hidden sector. Symmetrically, these results weaken the idea of shadow activities as incubators 
of infan
4 – Simulations and comparative statics 
 
In order to substantiate the main analytical predictio e theoretical model, some simple numerical 
simulations are performed. The baseline spe cation of the ’s parameters has been drawn from Boeri and 




ent can be represented by growth of y in bo
t industries because they attract the less qualified entrepreneurs and workers even in the case of a 





β  0.50 
r 0.03 
ρ  0.06 
δ  0.15 
τ  0.20 
u  1  0.12
c 0.40 





Further,  =2 and  2 . 0 = γ γ β > .   because in our model 
  The simulation confirms that the function  ( ) s v T  is monotonically decreasing in . 
Moreover, alth on shows that 
neurial ability x that is negative 
exponential.
23 As a result, a unique couple of ( vs , T ) exists in the benchmark model. 
                                                          
  s v
ough the function [8] is indeterminate for  0 → s v , the simulati
for 0 ≈ v   the vertical starting-point of [8] is clearly higher than the intercept of [10]. s
22 
Regarding function [10], we use a distribution for the entrepre
 
21 Elasticity of matching function (Cobb-Douglas functional form) with respect to unemployment rate. 
22 For example, for vs = 0.001, T is equal to 5.216. 
23 A negative exponential distribution is also used by Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) for the distribution of 
productivity. 
  18 ========== Fig. 4 about here (now at the end) ========== 
    The effects of parameter changes, which are interesting for policy purposes, on the 
stable interior equilibrium are summarized in Table 2 below: 





= Θ   T   s v   r v  
0 > Δρ   _ _ +  + 
0 > Δφ   _  _  +  + 
0 > Δτ
 
+  + _  _ 
0 > Δc
 
+ +  _  _ 
() 0 > − ⋅ Δ y y p _ _  +    +  s r
Table 2 
 
The effects of a change in the intensity of monitoring ( 0 > Δρ ), the severity of punishment for 
concealing business underground ( 0 > Δφ )
24, as well as the effect of higher taxes ( 0 > Δτ ), confirm the 
results obtained in other s dies of shadow economies (Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000). 
In our model, c reflects the burden on start-up. Hence, a decrease in c can possibly
tu
 be achieved by 
restructu come is a drop in th
m
onomy and holds in many cross-sectional studies (Bouev, 2005). 
ring bureaucracy. As a result, the out e equilibrium value of  s v  and an increase in 
the equilibrium value o A shadow employ ent that is increasing in labour market regulations is common to 
other models of the shadow ec
f  r v . 
Finally, the productivity differential,  ( ) 0 > − ⋅ Δ s r y y p , contributes to reduction of the hidden sector 
because the greater is  y p⋅  (or the lower is  y ), the wider are th r s
ar sectors. 
e surplus differentials and wage gap between 
regular and irregul
 particular, the simulation shows the special role played by the parameters which regulate the 
cceleration/deceleration of the externalities: in fact, the greater is 
The calibration of the extended model considers the parameter values in equations [15] and [16] such as 
to ensure that T > 0. The result is depicted in Fig.5. 
========== Fig. 5 about here (now at the end) ========== 
In
3 Φ a  and the lower is  , the higher is the 
p” of the extended function [8], because the negative externalities rise faster and the positive ones end up 
 
 






5 – Final remarks on policy implications 
 
24 This effect on T is very small. 
  19 
Policies to reduce the hidden sector emerge as advisable from our analysis of both the benchmark and 
the extended model. 
Any policy action that discourages the profitability of irregular firms will very likely improve the 
overall production level and productivity. Both entrepreneurs and workers take advantage of their qualities, 
while ta
of ρ or φ shift function [8] in Fig. 5 downwards, thus reducing the equilibrium level of . The 
efficacy
gion effect of the negative 
external
ithout any further policy action. 
an in the irregular one. Moreover, the model tells us that the effect of greater education works through 
the increase of   and the downwards shift of function [8]. This reduces the equilibrium level of  and 
increase ctivity and production beyond and above the simple composition effect between the two 
sectors. 
x morality is strengthened. But the extended model yields a further result in this regard, since it suggests 
policy actions from the sectoral perspective, rather than from the firm perspective alone, with possible powerful 
effects when irregular practices are widespread. 
Firm-perspective policies are a reduction of taxes (τ ), of start-up costs (c), and increased controls (ρ ) 
and penalties (φ ). All these policy actions reduce the proportion of the hidden sector because the reduction of τ 
or c, and the rise    s v
 of each of these policy actions is difficult to evaluate, since much depends on the relative amount of 
changes in the parameters, for which there is no yardstick. Indeed, the model is not built for determination of the 
optimal policy.  
The extended model provides further parameters which are eligible for policy actions, i.e. the 
parameters that specify the externalities from sectors on firms. The parameters in [15] suggest reducing 
administrative and bureaucratic burdens and also detecting and punishing criminal and illegal activities. But 
parameter Φ3 plays a special role, and it should suggest something more specific. This parameter, in fact, 
regulates the acceleration of the negative externalities, and if it is great, it may be responsible for the equilibrium 
of the “bad” type. This parameter suggests policy actions intended to combat the conta
ities, as appear from the diffusion of the bad practices like bribes and protection money. If Φ3 is 
sufficiently reduced, then the “hump” of the extended function [8] in Fig. 6 is smoothed out, and the system 
spontaneously converges to the “good” equilibrium w
The parameters in [16], on the other hand, suggest the provision of infrastructure, services, and network 
facilities. Development policies of this kind also emerge as very high-return actions because they may work to 
smooth out the “hump” of the extended function [8]. 
An interesting parameter for policy action would be x, i.e. entrepreneurial ability. Education, in fact, 
may be important for increasing entrepreneurial ability (Draghi, 2006), although the evidence on this point is not 
robust (Cappariello and Zizza, 2009). Education to improve entrepreneurial ability is especially favourable 
because it raises efficiency more in regular firms than in irregular ones and raises efficiency more in the regular 
sector th





Appendix A: The geography of the hidden economy, and of the organised crime in Italy 
  20Figure 1 shows how the hidden economy, measured by regional employment rates of irregular labour, 
is localised in Italy. Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of organized crime, measured by an index 
calculated as the sum of typical crimes committed by criminal organisations, i.e. extortion and the creation of 
criminal associations (including mafia-type ones), per 10,000 inhabitants. The similarity between the two figures 
is striking. 
         
Figure 1: The geography of hidden labour.   Figure 2: The geography of the organized crime 
  Source: ISTAT (2005)  Source: Daniele and Marani (2008) 
 
Appendix B: Wage setting 
  The first order condition of th imal sharing of surplus in the official sector yields: 
) r r r r r U W V J w − ⋅ − = max arg  
e opt
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Simple manipulations give the final formula for the wage in the official sector [5]:
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  The same procedure applies for wages in the hidden sector: 







s s s s w y x w τ φ ρ γ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅
⋅ = ⇒  
s f r g r θ ρ δ γ θ ρ δ + + + − + + + 1
() ( ) [] ( ) [ ] ( ) τ φ ρ θ ρ δ γ θ ρ δ γ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ + + + ⋅ = ⋅ + + + ⋅ − ⇒ s s s s s s w y x g r w f r 1
  So that the final formula for wages in the hidden sector [6] is: 
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  Appendix C: Equilibrium in
    In order to prove the existence of one stable equilibrium in the benchmark model, the associated 
x
s                                                    [C.1] 
() () () ( ) t T y y u t v T t T s r s − =   ,   , / &                                                                                              [C.2] 
irregular vacancies. As regards [C.2], because T is not 
characteri by flows, but is a threshold value, we consider the simple difference in continuous time between 
the new and the previ ue of T. From [C.1] and [C.2] we get: 
+ + + ⋅ −




 the benchmark model 
dynamic equations are required, i.e.: 
() ( )
()
() () () t f t v x dF x t v
t T
θ ⋅ − = ∫   &                  s s
min
[C.1] shows the transition flows in and out of 
sed 
ous val






















In this very simple case, the equilibrium emerges from study of the “phase diagram” as depicted
 in Fig. 3. 
Appendix D: Threshold value of regular vacancies 
From equation [14], we get: 
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because we are interested in the value of vr such that  0 / r uv ∂ ∂>: 
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in the Cobb-Douglas case, i.e. m = v  u , we obtain: 
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Appendix E: Beveridge Curves analysis 
  22From equation [14], we get
25: 
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Assuming that  θ θ > , i.e.  , and knowing that s r v v >   ( ) 0 ' > i g θ ,  ()0 ' ' < i g θ , we obtain 
() () r s g g θ θ ' ' >  and eventually we have  s r v u v u ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ / / . 
  Appendix F: Equilibrium in the extended model 
    Linearizing the dynamic equations around the steady state 
  
( )   *, * s vT yields: 
[] () [] * * s s s s v v f T T v − ⋅ − − ⋅ Θ = θ &  
[] [ * * T T v v T s s − − − ⋅ Ψ − = &   ]
















In matrix form, we get: 
where   is the coefficients matrix. 




























































() [] () ( Ψ − ⋅ Θ ) − − − ⋅ − − λ λ θ 1 s f  
() [] () Ψ ⋅ Θ + − − ⋅ − − λ λ θ 1 s f  
{} { } Λ + Λ ⋅ − ⇒ det tr λ λ
2  
where  {} Λ tr ( )1 − − =  and  {} ( ) Ψ ⋅ Θ + = Λ s f det θ s f θ  are the trace and the determinant of the matrix 
Stable equilibrium conditions require that: 
                                                          
respectively. 
 
ect to both vr and vs: 
25 Equation [14], like the standard Beveridge Curve, is a convex function with resp
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where: Η ≡ [(δ + ρ)· g(θr) + δ· g(θs) + δ· (δ + ρ)]. 
26 In the extreme intersections (or lateral equilibria), we know that: ∂T / ∂vs < 0. 
  23{} () {} 0 1 < − = Λ s f tr θ −  
ative, and then the lateral equilibria are stable. 
  When we analyse the intersection in the middle, we must recall that: 
Indeed, in our case the trace is neg
0 / s Tv Ψ≡∂ ∂ > &  
and thus, in this case, we obtain: 
{} ( ) Θ − = Λ s f det θ Ψ ⋅  
  () s f θ > Ψ ⋅ Θ if , then 
If the de egative sign, then a saddlepoint exists in the equilibrium point between the lateral ones, 
cted in Fig. 4. 
{} 0 < Λ det . 
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